This is a paper written for my 16th Century Literature and Culture course.
It was recognized with the English Essay Award in 2016.
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“Infection from the Wise:”
Erasmus and Shakespeare Diagnose Early Humanism
When humanism was in its infancy, scholars like Giovanni Pico Della Mirandola and Niccolò Machiavelli placed a premium on reason. Humans were praised for their virtu and ability to be rational. However, attitudes shifted as the 16th century drew to a close. In particular, Erasmus and Shakespeare undercut earlier values in their respective works, A Praise of Folly and A Midsummer Night’s Dream. For one, when Folly erases the merits of reason, she not only clears her name but also challenges how people perceive her. Furthermore, she maintains that reason and folly are co-dependent. Shakespeare augments Erasmus’ idea in his play, where Petrarchan love vanquishes the mind to show the instability of reason. Ultimately, Erasmus and Shakespeare defy earlier humanists in their refusal to glorify human potential. Reason was a pillar of early humanism, yet it erodes in the said texts.
First, Folly disillusions the audience as she exposes the superficiality of reason. She tears off the veneer most scholars wear, saying, “Those who lay special claim to be called the personification of wisdom…strut around ‘like apes in purple’ and ‘asses in lion skins’” (Erasmus 13). Here, she shatters the charade of conventional scholars. They are but fools who decorate themselves to appear knowledgeable. Folly thus exposes the hypocrisy of reason: those who claim to be wise rely on tactics to maintain that façade. She also attacks those who pepper their speech with Greek and Latin (Erasmus 14). These false scholars are not truly learned in their craft, but borrow scanty phrases to embellish their words. This conjures the illusion of wisdom. They are not truly knowledgeable, but rely on disguise to fool those around them. She effectively reveals the defective ways in which people project and perceive wisdom.
To Folly, wisdom is but a costume and this idea echoes Machiavelli’s concept of roleplaying (57). Just as princes rely on the construction of the self, false scholars depend on image-building. Here, Folly’s skepticism of reason emerges. What was considered wisdom at her time was only a shallow demonstration. Moreover, she blames the general populace. Reason is illusory but people are nonetheless entranced by the spectacle. In this way, she suggests that reason – or at least its impostor – thrives on folly. People need to be foolish enough to believe the performance for its success. Folly insists that one cannot exist without another. Moreover, folly is a benchmark to measure reason. This harkens back to Bacchus, the god of wine, and Apollo, the god of reason. The juxtaposition of the two shows that one cannot master self-restraint until he has indulged. In the same way, no one can attain true wisdom without reveling in folly.
Folly also weaves the influences of capitalism into her argument. Reason has not only been reduced to mirage, but it has become corrupt. She denounces scholars for their avarice, as they primarily use their knowledge for profit (Erasmus 11). Folly sees that values have decayed: knowledge is commodified and everything is a transaction. This degradation was already rampant in the heyday of Machiavelli. He characterizes humans as “ungrateful, fickle, liars, and deceivers” (Machiavelli 54). However, in Erasmus’ time, wisdom is no longer praised like it was at the time of The Prince. Mirandola’s concept of using “natural philosophy” for ascension up the ladder is discarded (229). Reason becomes an instrument for personal gain, not a means of self-improvement.
Additionally, Folly demonstrates that she is wrongfully vilified by dismantling the barrier between reason and folly. Specifically, the two cohabit one body but are constantly wrestling for domination (Erasmus 29). This turmoil shows that a person cannot be entirely rational or entirely foolish. Therefore, the binary is not as immutable as humanists have initially thought. Wisdom is tethered to reason, but folly is anchored by two powerful “tyrants”: anger and lust (Erasmus 30). Such passions eclipse the mind by its sheer proportion: it has “confined reason to a cramped corner of the head” (Erasmus 29). Humans are then at the mercy of their desires, which are dictated by their folly. However, Shakespeare looks at how reason can be equally harmful. To this end, he uses one of folly’s henchmen: lust.
First, reason is misapplied because the characters’ distorted perceptions. Folly argues that humans are endowed with a “modicum” of reason to solve problems (Erasmus 30). However, the characters in the play struggle to distinguish between rational thought and passionate fancies. For instance, Hermia hopes her father would kindle the same affection she has for Lysander by adopting her perspective (1.3.56). Hermia attributes her love to reason just because her “eyes” tell her so, showing the “irrational quality of love” (Stockard 9). Emily Stockard argues that the characters layer an idealized vision of the world onto reality by way of their senses (10). The lovers are not only lead astray by this fanciful habit, but also believe that what they see is a product of reason. This captures the human tendency to treat sensory perceptions as irrefutable. Yet, the barrier between reason and folly dissolves when senses mingle with the two categories. The love juice debunks the reliability of senses, further problematizing the role of reason.
When Puck administers the love juice to the lovers, he shows the malleability of reason. Lysander wakes up to find he is in love with Helena and attributes the change to his judgement: “Reason says you are the worthier maid…Reason becomes the marshal to my will/And leads me to your eyes” (2.2.121-127). Lysander’s disorientation shows that reason is easily usurped by passion. He thinks that he is using rational thought to guide his affection, unbeknownst to the fact he is under a spell. Lysander’s error underscores the instability of reason and therefore, its susceptibility to trickery. Ironically, passion is far more steadfast than reason. Such a paradox enfeebles the role of logic: how valuable is reason if lust easily debilitates it?
The shortcomings of reason are encapsulated in the play’s deceptively wholesome ending. Theseus likens the lovers to madmen for having “such seething brains,/Such shaping fantasies, that apprehend/More than cool reason ever comprehends” (5.1.4-6). At the end, the couples are blithely ignorant of their change. Their reason is impaired. This is especially true for Demetrius, who unwitting marries under the influence of the love juice. The artificial fulfillment reinforces Folly’s argument that she is needed for a happy life. She delivers joys where it is most desolate, a skill that reason does not possess (Erasmus 10). This opposes Mirandola’s argument for man to be more god-like. He urges humans to relinquish worldly desires for the sake of spiritual betterment (229). Yet, Erasmus and Shakespeare find the pursuit of pleasure more rewarding. They demolish the idea that reason and folly are discrete categories. Reason willingly surrenders to folly and humans relish in this defeat. However, what are the implications of the collapse?
Stockard argues that in A Praise of Folly, “Human folly can be construed as an instrument of providence… [and] Shakespeare follows this pattern in A Midsummer Night's Dream” (5). However, the two texts challenge religious ideals as they deconstruct reason and folly. Folly herself is divine (Erasmus 9), but she is “swayed by the dictates of passion” (Erasmus 29). Deities are no longer hailed as infallible beings. This progression is also seen in the play, particularly in the quarrelsome dynamic between Oberon and Titania. The fairy world is fraught with disorder, misconduct, and petty revenge. Such human-like madness subverts conventional representations of the divine. By extension, this demystifies the fairy world; angels are no longer paragons but descend to the level of humans. This caricature of gods may reveal the anxiety surrounding religion in the late 16th century, demonstrating how far humanism has been removed from Mirandola.
However, the matter is further complicated when folly and reason are hybridized in the “wise fool” (Erasmus 13). Claudia Zatta posits that “While unveiling the follies of the world Folly discloses herself” (544). Folly acts foolish, but her insight betrays her performance. She is not as thoughtless as she appears. Yet, she sets herself apart from scholars when she asserts the veracity of her words: “I’ve no use for cosmetics; my face doesn’t pretend to be anything different from my innermost feelings” (Erasmus 13). She promises that she does not disguise herself and declares that she has no ulterior motives. However, the audience must remember that she is Folly. The resultant problem is how much credence should be given to someone who is innately unreliable.
Like the false scholars, Folly herself is engaged in a roleplay. Zatta argues that she distances herself from folly as she enumerates the foolish human qualities (545). However, Folly’s argument is crafted using reason. This contradiction may be a part of Erasmus’ method. Specifically, those who claim to be wise offer hollow information, while those who admit their foolishness make astute observations. This is seen in Puck, who delights in the folly of the mortals (3.2.114-115). While the couples are trapped in a feverish chase, he understands that Petrarchan love is nothing beyond a “sport” (3.2.119). Puck, an ostensible fool, can see what the rational humans cannot. Falstaff of Shakespeare’s Henry IV, Part I exhibits the same clarity. He censures the fruitless hunt for honor, seeing it as nothing but “a word…air, [and] a trim reckoning” (5.1.133-134). He may spend most of his days in a drunken stupor, but his decadence is no worse than the pursuit of a meaningless goal. In all three cases, the wise fools are disenchanted from the delusions the other characters are trapped in. This paradox entreats the audience to doubt those who project an image of wisdom.
Overall, Erasmus and Shakespeare challenge the previously established views of reason and folly. Specifically, they not only classify the two as complementary, but illustrate the perils of an over-reliance on reason. It is not only futile when one is intoxicated by passion, but reason also acts as a blindfold. Even Bottom knows that “man is but an ass” (4.1.204). Ironically, the most foolish character illuminates the chief flaw of human beings. Therefore, folly gives a person awareness of his condition. Like Erasmus, Shakespeare suggests that people should not hastily banish foolishness, as life without it is an impoverished one. Moreover, humans should not harbour the arrogance encouraged by the earlier humanists. Michel de Montaigne argues that human beings do not have the credentials to exalt themselves as superior to beasts, let alone god-like (330). He awakens people from this misbelief and urges them to “return to the majority” (Montaigne 336). Overall, early humanists embarked on a search for the self but their successors have found a more humble position for them to stand.
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Works Cited
Erasmus of Rotterdam. Praise of Folly .Translator: Betty Radice. London: Penguin, 1993. Print.
Machiavelli, Niccolò. The Prince. Translator: George Bull. London: Penguin, 2003. Print.
Mirandola, Giovanni Pico Della. “Oration on the Dignity of Man.” The Renaissance Philosophy of Man. Eds. Ernst Cassirer, et al. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948. Print.
Montaigne, Michel de. Apology for Raymond Sebond. Translator: Donald M. Frame. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958. Print.
Shakespeare, William. A Midsummer Night’s Dream. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. Print.
Shakespeare, William. Henry IV, Part I. New York: Oxford University Press, 1987. Print.
Stockard, Emily E. “Transposed to Form and Dignity: Christian Folly and the Subversion of Hierarchy in A Midsummer Night's Dream.” Religion & Literature 29.3 (1997): 1-20. Web. 30 November 2015.
Zatta, Claudia. “Democritus and Folly: The Two Wise Fools”. Bibliothèque d'Humanisme et Renaissance 63.3 (2001): 533–549. Web. 30 November 2015.